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Faculty and Deans

DOPING OUT THE
CAPITALIZATION RULES

AFTER/NDOpeO
by John W. Lee

John W. Lee is a professor of law at Marshall-Wythe
School of Law, College of William and Mary.
III this article, Lee provides guidance for Treasury
and the IRS (ilt their promised clarification of application of INDOPCQ). He delineates how to avoid what ...
he perceives as the past pitfalls of capitalization of
recurring, insubstantial, or relatively short-lived expenditures with Ito, or inadequate, amortization. The
article also sets forth models for (a) amortizing as. a
freestanding deferred charge long-lived substantial
self-created intangibles such as business expansion
costs, including employee training cosls, and (b) ex,
pensing, or perhaps better, amortizing currently less
substantial or regularly recurring, steady state selfcreated intangibles (such as repairs and advertising, .
respectively).
This article is derived from a chap ter on
"Capitalization" ill a manusc'ript for a textbook on ".
"Taxation of Capital Transactions" currently in
preparatioll by Professor Lee and Gene Seago, R.B . ...
Pamplin Professor of Accounting, Virginia Poly tech- .
Ilic Institute and State University.
.
..... ": .
Copyright © 1992, John W. Lee and W. Eugene Seago ... ;.,'
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The words of Koheleth son of David, King in
Jerusalem.

Only that shall happen
Which has happened,
Only that shall occur
Which has occurred;
There is nothing new
Beneath the sun!
Sometimes there is a phenomenon of which they say,
"Look, this one is new" - it occurred long since, in
ages that went before us. The earlier ones are not
remembered; so, too, those that will occur later will no
more be remembered than those that will occur at the
very end .
(Ecclesiastes Chapter 1, Verses 9 through 11 (Tanach,
a new translation of the Holy Scriptures according to
the traditional Hebrew text).)
I. INTRODUCTION

As we all know now, the Supreme Court in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm 'rl at long last rejected the "separate
saleable asset" doctrine under which expenditures
with substantial future benefits could be currently
deducted so long as they did not create or enhance a
separate asset. The Tax Executives Institute (TEl)
charged that IJIRS field agents have been running wild,
using the ruling to deny all manner of deductions."2
TEl was concerned about challenges to the deductibility of advertising, employee training, and repair
and maintenance expenses,3 all of which often provide
future as well as current benefits. Fortunately, the Service plans to address the application of INDOPCO to
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1112 S. Ct. 1039 (Feb. 26, 1992).
2Zeidner, "Treasury-IRS Business Plan Wins Praise," 92
Tax Notes Today 112-4 (May 29, 1992) (quoting Tim McCormally, Tax Counsel for Tax Executives Institute) .
u
3 TEI Warns of IRS Agents Poised To Disallow Historically
Deductible Expenses," 92 Tax Notes Today 97-26 (May 7,1992).
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these items before year end under its "1992 Business
P lan."4 Service representatives have correctly stated
that the Supreme Court did not change the longtime
s tandards for d istinguishing currently deductible expenses from capital expenditu res except to overrule the
"separate saleable asset" doctrine. s And in Rev. Rul.
92-80,6 the Service, with scant analysis of such standards, concluded that INDOPCO "does not affect the
treatment of advertising costs as business expenses
which are generally deductible under section 162 .... "

I

The Supreme Court in INDOPCO, Inc.
v. Comm'r at long last rejected the
'separate saleable asset' doctrine.

This article reviews those standards and makes
recommendations as to administrative guidelines for
post-INDOPCO resolution of current deducti bili ty / ca pi taliza ti on -cum -amortiza tion of expenditures with present and future benefits. The most important lessons in this area over the past 25 years or so
are: (1) If an expenditure by a new business, such as
e mployee training, provides fu ture benefits for a
shorter period than the life of the business, its plant,
or operating permit, the capitalized expendi ture
should not be added to the basis of the business, plant,
or permit, but instead should be treated as a freestanding self-created intangible amortizable over the shorter
period benefitted (where section 195 does not apply);

4Avakian-Martin, "INDOPCO Guidance Likely To Cover
Advertising, Repairs, Training," 56 Tax Notes 545 (Aug. 3,
1992). The Treasury-IRS "Business Plan 1991," electronically
reproduced, 92 Tax Notes Today 104-50 (May 15,1992), identified
broad subject matter areas and specific topics, including under
the subject of tax accounting, "Guidance on INDOPCO,"
where the Office of Tax Policy of the Treasury Department and
the IRS intend to provide gUidance before the end of 1992.
5 Avakian-Martin, "IRS To Move Carefully in Releasing
INDOPCO Guidance," 92 Tax Notes Today 152-3 Guly 27,
1992). INDOPCO in essence merely held that the reading of
Lincoln Savings as establishing "creation or enhancement of
an asset" as a prerequisite to capitalization was incorrect.
Lincoln Savings stands for the simple proposition
that a taxpayer's expenditure that "serves to create or
enhance ... a separate and distinct" asset should be
capita lized under section 263. It by no means follows,
however, that only expenditures that create or enhance
separate and distinct assets are to be capitalized under
section 263 . .. .
Nor does our statement in Lincoln Savings . .. that
"the presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some
future aspect is not controlling" prohibit reliance on'
future benefit as a means of distinguishing an ordinary
business expense from a capital expenditure. Although
the mere presence of an incidental future benefit "some future aspect" - may not warrant capitalization,
a taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year in
which the expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in determining whether the appropria te tax
treatment is immediate deduction or capitalization. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1044-45 (footnotes omitted).
61992-39 I.R.B . 7 (Sept. 1992).
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(2) if an expenditu re, such as advertising, provides
current a n d fu ture benefits and is regularly incurred in
roughly the same amount year-aFter-year, or almost
every year, i t should be currently deductible if
capitaliz ing and a m ortizing would be burdensome;
and (3) if an exp enditure, such as repa irs, provides
current and future ben efits but is not subs tantial in
comparison to total replacement cost of the repaired
item, it sh ould b e currentl y deductible. Not only are
th ese "rough ju stice" approaches supported by more
than mere straws in the win d in the existing case law
(and commentary), but ignori n g them brought about
the widespread adoption of the separate asset doctrine
in the first place.
II. PURPOSE OF CAPITALIZATION

The purpose of capitalization under section 263 (and
the resulting basis increase under section 1016)1 is largely
timing: to "p revent a taxpayer from uti lizing currently
a ded uction p roperly attributable, through am ortization, to later tax years when the capital assets become
income producing."B The same p ur pose is also effected
by the "ordinary" expense requirement of sec tion 162,9
and the "clear-refl ection-of-in come" requirement of
section 446. In sh o rt, the function of the capitaliza tion
requirement coupled w ith amortization is to avoid distor tion of in come.

7S ections 263(a)(1) and (a}(2), respectively, prohibit a current deduction under sections 162 or 212 for (a) any amount
paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements
made to increase the value of any property, and (b) any
amount expended in restoring property or in making good its
exhaustion for which a depreciation, amortization, or depletion allowance is or has been made. Treas. Reg. section
1.263(a)-1 (a)(2). Section 1016(a)(1 }(a) adjusts a property's basis
upward for the cost of capital improvements and similar items
chargeable to capital account. If the property is used in a trade
or business or held for investment, such adjusted basis may
then be "recovered" through: (a) depreciation or amortization
over the property's useful life, if subject to exhaustion through
use in the taxpayer's business or section 212 income-producing activity; or (b) deduction from the amount realized in
computing gain or loss under section 1001 upon a subsequent
sale or other taxable disposition of the property.
8Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. I, 16 (1973);
accord, INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1042-43.
The primary effect of characterizing a payment as
either a business expense or a capital expenditure concerns the timing of the taxpayer's cost recovery. While
business expenses are currently deductible, a capital
expenditure usually is amortized and depreciated over
the life of the relevant asset, or where no specific asset
or useful life can be ascertained, is deducted upon
dissolution of the enterprise. .. Sections 167(a) and
336(a); Treas. Reg. section 1.176(a) . .. Through
provisions such as these, the Code endeavors to match
expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to
which they are properly attributable, thereby resulting
in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax
purposes.
95ee, Comm ', v. Tellier, 383 U.s. 687,689-90 (1966).
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III. BLACK LETTER RULES
A. One-Year Rule of Thumb

Early cases frequently required capitaliza tion because the benefits of the expenditure lasted longer than
the yearly accounting period .lO This doctrin~ resulted
in the classic definition of a capital expenditure as a
cost securing an advantage to the taxpayer that has a
life of more than one year. l1 Otherwise, capital expenditures were deductible under this rationale if the useful life of the property was less than one yearY More
recently, the one-year rule of thumb has been properly
viewed as "intended to serve as a mere guidepost for
the resolution of the ultimate issue, not as an absolute
rule requiring the automatic capitalization of every
expend iture providing the taxpayer with the benefit
enduring for a period in excess of one year. "13 But
generally, where an expenditure provides substantial
future benefits, current deduction understates the
taxpayer's current income and overstates future income. J4

I

The function of the capitalization
requirement coupled with amortization
is to avoid distortion of income.

Exceptions to future benefit capitalization make the
rule. Distortion of income should be the lodestar, not
merely future benefit. Misfocus on future benefit alone
led some courts to describe the exceptions permitting
current deduction of expenditures providing current and
future benefits (such as repair, educational costs, or a
sales salary) as due to "considerations of expediency"J5
or "considerations of pragmatism and uncertainty."16

JOSee, e.g., W.B. Harbeson Lumber Co. v. Comm'r, 24 B.T.A.
542,550 (1931); see generally, Note, "Income Tax Accounting:
Business Expense or Capital Outlay," 46 Harv. L. Rev. 669
(1934).
II See United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742 (10th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956 (1958); accord, Fall River Gas Appliance
Co. v. Comm'r, 349 F.2d 515 (lst Cir. 1965).
12Helvering v. Kansas City American Ass'n Baseball Co., 70
F.2d 600,604 (8th Cir. 1935); Nachman v. Comm'r, 12 T.c. 1204,
1207 n.1 (1949), aff'd, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951). See Treas.
Reg. section 1.263(a)-2(a).
J3Ullited States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968);
accord, Sears Oil Co. v. Comm'" 359 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1966). See
generally, Lee & Murphy, "Capital Expenditures: A Result in
Search of a Rationale," 15 U. Richmond L. Rev. 473, 477-78
(1981).
JWCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 961 (4th Cir.
1981) ("NCNB
rev'd and remanded, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir.
1982) (en banc) ("NCNB l/") . NCNB II was overruled by INDOPCO. Whether this overruling of NCNB II resurrects
NCNB I may be a determinative factor in the future evolu~on
of case law and administrative guidelines on expense/capItal
expenditure and amortization.
IsFis hman v. Comlll'" 837 F.2d 309, 311 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.); accord, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. Comm'r, 685 F.2d
212,217 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).
16NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 961; id. at 962 ("not-worth-thetrouble exception").

n.
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Such "analysis" appeared inspired by the Supreme
Court's noting in Comm'r v. Lincoln Savings & Loan
Ass'n17 that the presence of an ensuing future benefit was
not controlling because many concededly deductible expenses have prospective effect beyond the tax year.
The real problem with the future benefits test in practice was the tendency to add the capitalized cost of, say,
employee training in a new business .to th~ basis of a
nonamortizable asset such as the busmess Itself or an
indefinite life permit. For example, in the leading presection 195 start-up cost decision, Richmond Television
Corp. v. Ullited States,I8 the contested start-up costs consisted largely of broadcasting staff training expenses,
primarily expenses of training a staff for two years (to
operate a television broadcasting station) incurred prior
to receipt of an FCC TV broadcasting license and, hence,
commencement of commercial TV broadcasting. The
government primarily argued that the training of the
broadcasting staff created a capital asset in the form of a
reservoir of skills with continuing benefits over the
period of years. Consequently, charging against the first
year's income the large outlays required to acquire the
staff would produce a gross distortion of the taxable
income for that year. 19 The Fourth Circuit accepted the
government's creation of a capital asset benefitting future
years and distortion-of-income argument as an alternative holding. 20 The Supreme Court remanded for con-

17 403

U.S. 345, 354 (1971) (The court did not enumerate any
such deductible future benefit expenditures). Lincoln Savings
& Loan considered the deductibility of a payment by an S&L
to a reserve fund held by a federal agency. In deciding whether
the payment was a contribution to an asset or an expense, the
court said:
What is important and controUing, we feel is that
the ... payment serves to create or enhance for Lincoln
what is essentially a separate and distinct additional
asset and that, as an inevitable consequence, the payment is capital in nature and not an expense, let alone
an ordinary expense, deductible under section
162(a) ... .
403 U.S. at 354. While concluding that the contribution to
the reserve fund was capital, the court specifically rejected
the argument that the expenditure was not deductible simply
because it had an effect beyond one year.
18345 F.2d 901, 905-07 (4th Cir.), vacated and ,emanded per
curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965).
19Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Richmond Television Corp. v.
United States, supra. See generally Lee, ,.A Blend of Old Wines
in a New Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond," 29 Tax L. Rev.
347. 458 (1974). And capitalizing those costs and adding them
to the basis of a nonamortizable broadcasting license wouldn't?
20Dou bly unfortunately, Richmond Television first
proceeded to survey several investigatory and start-up-cost
decisions, concluding that: "The uniform teaching of these
several cases is that, even though a taxpayer has made a firm
decision to enter into business and over a considerable period
of time spent money for preparation for entering that business, he still has not 'engaged in carrying on any trade or
business' within the intendment of section 162(a) until such
time as the business has begun to function as a going concern
and performed those activities for which it is organized." 345
F.2d at 907 (footnotes omitted). Thus was born the start-upcost doctrine in its modem guise.
671
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sideration of whether the cost added to the basis the
. was amor ti' zabl e. 21
broadcasting permIt

The real problem with the future
benefits test was the tendency to add
the capitalized cost to the basis of a
nonamortizable asset such as the
business itself or an indefinite life
permit.
Similarly, the Claims Court, in Cleveland Elec. Illu.m .
Co. v. United States,22 added the capitalized cost of tra1Oing emplo-yees for a nuclear powered elect:icity
generating plant to the basis o~ the nonamortl~able
oRerating permit. This approach Itself produces dlstorti6n of income when recurring expenditures (e.g., staff
training expenses) are added to a nonamor.tizable asset,
such as an indefinite-life operating permit. Moreover,
using this approach with a new business requi.rin~ a
license creates a conceptual quandary - how to Justify
the current deduction of similar training costs by an
ongoing business in expansion. (This would cause a
fatal conceptual flaw in section 195 as drafted. B ) An
example of this problem is allowing curr~nt deduct~on
of staff training cos ts for a new branch 10 expand10g
the same business, while requiring capitalization of
start-up costs for identical s taff training for ~ new
branch in a different location or a new busmess.
Cleveland Electric llluminating faced precisely this problem: deductibility of employee training expenses for
the initial work force at a new coal-fired generating
plant similar to its existing generating plants .and. of
training expenses for the initial work force at Its hrst
nucl ear powered generating plant. The Claims Court
atte mpted to distinguish the two expenses on the
grounds that the new business (nuclear power ge~e~at
ing plant) start-up costs for new employee tra10mg

21382 U.S. 68 (1965). On remand, the Fourth Circuit found
that the FCC broadcasting license was not amortizable because it was readily renewable. Richmond Television Corp. v.
Unit ed States, 354 F.2d 410,412 (4th Cir. 1965). The court made
two more errors here: (1) the pool of trained employees should
have been treated as a freestanding amortizable intangible;
and (2) where permit costs are recurring, they shou~d be amo~
tized over the period between permit renewals since that IS
the only period they benefit.
227 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985).
23Mea culpa. Lee, "Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and Clear
Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax
Reform, and a Touch of Basics," 6 Va. Tax Rev. 1,85-91 (1986)
(one of my earlier articles formed the conceptua.l model for
section 195 providing the definition in the Co~mlt~ee Report
for investigatory and start-up costs; that article dId not examine the und erlying clear reflection of income pOlicy of
capitalization). The seminal article advocating clear reflection of income as the basis for capitalization is Gu.nn, "The
Requirement that a Capi tal Expenditure Create or Enhance
an Asset," 15 B.C. Indu s. & Com. L. Rev. 443 (1974).
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were substantial, provided future benefits, and constituted a one-time expenditure. (The latter appears
factually wrong in light of industry exper~e~ce and
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ru~es . requ.m ng continuous retraining .) The court distinguished the
employee training costs for this "n~,,:" business
generating plant from the employee trammg costs for
"same" business generating plan~ because the sa ~e
business (fossil fuel power generat10g plant) expansIOn
costs for new employee training were not s? su?st~n
tial, replacement employees at it would receive s~mllar
training, and the employee turnover. rate was pz~oJected
as 10 percent per year at the coal-flfed plant. In ~d
dition, the Claims Court found that no new operat1Og
permit was required for the new plant in the same
business, an immediate benefit was present, and any
division of the cost according to immediate and future
years was thought impractical. The Claims Cour~ ~er
mitted immediate deduction for the employee tramIng
costs at the new coal-fired generating plant while
capitalizing the employee training costs at the new
nuclear-powered generating plant.
Other employee training costs for nuclear power
generating plant cases disclose, however, that
employee turnover at such plants a~so is ~igh and
employee retraining c.osts are substan~lal. For 1Osta n,c;~
the Tax Court in Madlsoll Gas & Electnc Co. v. Comm r
found that 1/7 of an operator's time at an atomic
powered generating plant subject t? the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (then the AtomiC Energy Commission) is devoted to retraining of the same scope and
extent as the original training (operators' licenses are
good for only two years and the NRC requir.es continuous retraining); turnover at the plant was high due
to an extremely competitive job market and "be~ause of
physical and psychological problems resulting tram the
pressures of the position" - the "Silkwood" factor - ;
and 34 percent of the training expenditures over a 10year period were attributable to employees no longer
employed at the end of the period .. ~iven such ~ pattern, adding the initial operator trammg expe~dltures
to the NRC license to operate the plant, which was
indefinite and thus nonamortizable, distorted the
taxpayer's income in Cleveland Electric. The court
derived from Richmond Television and its progeny the
"theory that where a business requires substantial
start-up expenditures before it can begin ope~ations,
which are not directly for the purchase of tangIble assets and which will not ordinarily be recovered out of
revenues for the same year, the capital investment is in
the business as a whoie rather than merely in tangibles,

24Why was the nuclear generating plant not merely a new
way of carrying on the same business? See Col~rado Springs
Nat'! Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Clr. 1974).
25
72 T.e. 521, 543-544 (1979), a/I'd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir.
1980) (the capitalization and amortization issue not raised by
the taxpayer).
TAX NOTES, November 2,1 992
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and it includes the start-up costS."26 The Claims
Court should have set up the "new business "
nuclear-powered generating plant employee training
costs (or perhaps only the excess over the average
amount of recurring retraining and replacement
training costs, with the latter amount currently deductible) as a freestanding asset amortizable over a
period based on projected employee turnover and
retraining rates. The fossil fuel generating plant
training costs similarly should have been set up as a
separate asset amortizable, probably, over 10 yearsY
Alternatively, both should have been currently deductible if, in fact, any allocation of cost to present
and future years was impractical. (On examinations,
most of my students choose this option.)
B. Origin-of-Claim

Both Richmond Television and Cleveland Electric
may be closer to purchased intangibles than selfcreated intangibles in that both involved reimbursing another entity for the employee training costs.
Although in theory, self-created and purchased intangibles as to a trained work force should be treated
a like, 28 neither Congress 29 nor the courts 30 seem so
inclined.

Although in theory, self-created and
purchased intangibles as to a trained
work force should be treated alike,
neither Congress nor the courts seem
so inclined.
The Supreme Court, in Woodward v. Comm'r,31 applied an "origin-of-the-claim" standard to capi talize
litigation expenses incurred by the taxpayers pursuant to state law requiring shareholders voting in
favor of a certain corporate action to purchase all of
the stock of the "dissenters" at its then value - the
litigation was over that value. The taxpayers argued
that a primary-purpose test applied, under which
capitalization was required only if the taxpayers'
primary purpose in incurring expenditures was to

26 7 Cl. Ct. a t 228.
27Lee, 6 Va . Tax Rev. at 67-7l.
28Mundstock, "Taxation of Business Intangible Capital,"
135 U. Pel1n. L. Rev. 1179 (1987).
29Proposed section 197, section 4501 of H.R. 4210, lOZnd
Con g., 2d Sess.
3°lthaca Indus ., Inc. v. Comm'r, 97 T.C. 253 (1991).
31397 U.5. 572, 576 (1970).
TAX NOTES, November 2, 1992

defend or perfect title to their own stock. The
Supreme Court disagreed. 32
The Fifth Circuit extended an origin-of-the-claim
analysis to business expansion costs, at least where a
separate location is acquired. 33 Central Texas Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. United States 34 analyzed a state branch
S&L permit as a "separate asset" with which it associated under the "origin-of-the-claim" rubric both
the permit's application costs and market survey costs.
The court denied any amortization ded uction, pointing
out that section 195 was not yet applicable. Tested
against a distortion of income analysis, the result in
Central Texas Savings & Loan was partly right and partly
wrong. The permit application costs were properly
capitalized and added to the cost of the nonamortizable
permit or branch (provided that the permit did not
have to be periodically reviewed), but the survey costs
(unless nonrecurring and used only in the acquisition
of the new branch permit but not in its subsequent

32 Woodward v. C01l1111'r, 397 U.S. 572, 576-78 (1970). Professor
Gunn has suggested that the policy underlying the "originof-the-claim" doctrine is that to allow a deduction for expenditures integrally related for the capital asset while taxing
related gain from the ultimate disposition of such asset as
capital gain without a reduction for the expenditure results in
a distortion of the character of the taxpayer's income as a
practical effect through the allowance under the late 1954 code
of 160-percent deduction (60-percent deduction under the late
1954 code for capital gains and 100-percent deduction for
expenditure). See Cunn, supra at 447 n.20; accord, Lee & Murphy, supra at 484. Tn 1992, the practical effect of the deduction
would be about 110 percent (the maximum capital gains rate
of 28 percent vs. the maximum permanent ordinary rate of 31
percent). Gunn's hypothesis has case-law support. For instance, Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 373,
378 (Ct. Cl. 1960), held that "[e)xpenses necessarily incurred
to realize a capital gain reduce the amount of that gain and
partake of the nature of the gain to which they relate." The
Court of Claims cited Arrowsmith v. Comm'r, 344 U.S. 6 (1952),
which, under this reading, would require capital treatment of
expenditures in a subsequent tax year integrally related to a
prior capital transaction on the theory that otherwise the taxpayer would obtain an additional tax benefit through coupling an ordinary deduction with a capital gain. See also Munn
v. United States, 455 F.2d 1028, 1033 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (if an expense
is incurred in the process of acquisition or disposition, "the
expenses simply take the character of the asset to which they
relate .... " Brown v. Comm'r, 529 F.2d 609, 613 (10th Cir. 1976)
(under Arrowsmith look at all events in the transaction and
here payment due to section 16(b) suit is related to proceeds
given earlier beneficial tax treatment). In United States v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970), a companion case to Woodward, the court also required capitalization of expenses ariSing
from an appraisal proceeding brought by shareholders of a
controlled subsidiary, dissenting to its merger with the parent.
The taxpayer had relied heavily on the fact that immediately
upon registering their dissent, title to the shares of the dissenters was vested in the subsidiary, but the court could not
see why the order of fixing price and conveying title should
make any difference.
33Centrai Texas S&L v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th
Cir. 1984); cf. Cleveland Elec. IlIum. Co. v. Ul1ited Sta tes, 7 CI.
Ct. 220, 225, 229 (1985) .
34731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984).
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operations) should then have been treated as a separate
asset and currently d educted or amortized depending
on the duration of benefits. Instead, the Fifth Circuit
(1) talismanically applied the acquisition cost doctrine
derived from Richmond Television and its progeny to the
(presumably recurring and limited-life) market survey
costs, then (2) mechanically associated them with an
indeterminable-life asset (the permits), and thereby (3)
precluded amortization. This recreated the no-man'sland of distortion of income through no deduction current or through amortization that, as discussed below,
led to the adoption of the separate saleable asset test
in the first place. The Supreme Court in INDOPCO
hinted that the Fifth Circuit's opinion was on the right
side of the conflict between the circuits over the
separate saleable asset test. 35 As discussed below, the
proper issue is whether the "asset" in such expansion
and similar cases is the business as a whole, the
license/branch, or a separate "freestanding" (amortizable) intangible.
C. The Separate and Distinct Asset Doctrine
The Lincoln Savings 36 reference to future benefit as
not controlling, and looking to whether the payment
served to create or enhance for the taxpayer "what is
essentially a separate and distinct additional asset," led
to a line of cases seeking to avoid Richmond Television's
no deduction/nor amortization distortion of income by
granting an equally flawed immediate deduction. (This
time, two wrongs did not make a right.) The Second
Circuit, in Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm'r,37 read Lincoll1 Savings as effectuating a radical shift in emphasis:
directing the inquiry from whether the benefit of the
expenditure extended over several tax years to where
it created or enhanced an essentially separate and distinct additional asset. This formulation of the test for
capitalization/current deduction was strongly criti-

35S ee 112 S. Ct. 1042 n.3.
36403

U.S. 345, 354 (1971).
375 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1973). In Briarcliff Candy, Loft's
had previously relied on candy sales in its own retail stores,
but their profitability had greatly declined as a result of the
population shift to the suburbs. Loft's, therefore, expended
substantial sums in setting up a separate "franchise" division
and in securing multiyear contracts with independently
operated suburban retaH outlets that agreed to carry Loft's
candies. Reasoning that the relevant tax law was "in a state
of hopeless confusion particularly where the issue concerns
[the deductibility of] an intangible contribution (such as a
salesman's work-product) to an intangible asset (such as his
company's position in the market}," the Second Circuit
reversed the Tax Court, which had upheld the
commissioner's determination that the expenditures in question should have been carried forward into, and the associa ted outlays should have been spread over, tax years in
which Loft's received the revenues from sales by the independent retail outlets. "[I]t is incumbent on the legislative
authorities making the statutes and the implementing regulations to furnish clear standards and guidelines as to what
intangible assets are deductible under section 162 and what
are not." Id.
37
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cized by Professors Gunn and Lee 38 and finally overruled by the Supreme Court in INDOPCO , Inc . v.

Comm'r.39

Lincoln Savings led to a line of cases
seeking to avoid Richmond
Television's no deduction/nor
amortization distortion of income
by granting an equally flawed
immediate deduction _
The separate and distinct asset approach was readily
applicable where a taxpayer acquiring, for example, a
new business,4o purchased land, vehicles, or equipment
or constructed a new building. The real conceptual
problem as to intangibles created in business expansion (or start-up costs for that matter) was determining
what constituted the separate asset: the business as a
whole or a separate (amortizable) intangibleY On the
one hand, a number of cases involved what normally
would be ordinary and necessary business expenses
but which were treated as part of the cost of acquisition
of a capital asset.42 In many cases, such costs, if recurring or of finite benefit, should be set up as a separate
amortizable intangible. 43 On the other hand, the
"separate, saleable asset" precondition for capitalization was overinclusive, permitting a current deduction
for (1) substantial expenditures benefitting an extended period of time although creating no transferable
asset, e.g., a computer program expected to last five
years,44 and (2) acquisition costs of a license with an
indefinite life. 45 A current deduction in s uch instances
produces more distortion of income than capitalization
as a free-standing asset amortizable over the benefitted
period.

38Gunn, "The Requirement that a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset," 15 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 443
(1974); Lee, "Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and Clear Reflection
of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, and a
Touch of Basics," 6 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 52-57 (1986).
39112 S. Ct. 1039 (Feb. 26, 1992).
40Vermont Transit Co. v. Comm'r, 218 F.2d 468 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 945 (1955).
41See Gunn, supra at 446, 492; Lee, supra 6 Va . Tax Rev. at
14,27-8,30-8.
42See, e.g., Shain berg v. Comm 'r, 33 T.e. 241 (1959) (cleaning
expenses to prepare shopping center for grand opening and
insurance premiums paid during construction period were
made in connection with acquisition of a capital asset);
Schultz v. Comm'r, 50 T.e. 688, 696 (1968) (insurance cost,
storage charges, and taxes paid during four years aging
period of whiskey purchased as investment were part of
acquisition price of four-year-old whiskey).
43Lee, supra 6 Va. Tax Rev. at 32-38.
44For example, in First Security Bank of Idaho v. Com III , r, 592
F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1979), the majority permitted deduction of
the cost of a computer program lasting five years used in
establishing a bank's credit card operation as a business expansion cost.
45NCNB (11),684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982), en banco
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In addition to its functional weakn esses, t h e
separate, saleable asset test was weak conceptually,
based upon a limited and oft-criticized read ing of Lincoln Savings. As the Claims Co u rt pointed out in
Clevelalld Electric lIIumillating Co. v. United States, the
"separate and distinct asset" referent in Lincoln Savings
only meant that in the particular case before the Court
the taxpayer's acquisition of such an asset was
decisive.46 Furthermore, a host of examples could be
found where capital treatment is required although no
separate and distinct asset was created or enhanced .47
For ins tance, start-up costs, minimum educational expenses, and new (i.e., different type), job-seeking expenses must be capitalized under the majority of
authorities although arguably a separate and distinct
asset was not acquired .

Despite conceptual failings, prior to
INDOPCO the 'separate saleable asset'
doctrine enjoyed great, but not
universal. success in the business
expansion area.
Despite all of these conceptual failings, prior to INDOPCO, the "separate saleable asset" doctrine enjoyed
great but not unive rsal 48 success in the business expansion area. A large number of early business expansion
cases involved establishment of credit card systems by
banks. The decisions universally held that the credit
card system enabled a bank to carryon an old business
in a new way and, hence, constituted the expansion of
an existing business rather than start-up costs of a new
business. 49 These dec isions also rejected the
government's argument that the start-up costs of the
credit card system were not ordinary expenses because
they generated future economic benefits, on the basis
of Lillcoln Savillgs,50 which they read as establishing
iron rules that the presence of an ensuing benefit that
may have some future aspect is not controlling; the
question is whether a separate asset was created or enhanced. The bank credit card progeny of Briarcliff Candy
found that participation in a credit card system did not

create a property right convertible into cash,5! and most
of them in establishing the "separate, saleable property
right" bright-line test for current deductibility of certain
business expansion costs contained common elements.
The expenses were recurring (and in Briarcliff Candy
increased annually in amount over a long period), and
thus were similar to many preopening expenses.
Moreover, as Judge Posner pointed out in Encyclopedia
Britannica, "[t]he distinction between recurring and
nonrecurring business expenses provides a very crude
but perhaps serviceable demarcation between those
capital expenditures that can be feasibly capitalized
and those that cannot be. "52 The most important common factor, however, was the view that a current
deduction of a recurring expense with some future
benefits was preferable to its capitalization without
amortization - "rough justice." The Second Circuit in
Briarcliff Candy merely charged Congress "to furnish
clear standards and guidelines as to what intangible
assets are deductible under section 162 and what are
not."53 The leading bank credit card decision, Colorado
Springs National Bank v. United States 54 , however, sharpened the thrust:
The start-up expenditures here challenged did
not create a property interest. They produced
nothing corporeal or salable. They are recurring.
At the most they introduced a more efficient
method of conducting an old bu s iness. The
government suggests no way in which they could
be amortized. The government's theoretical approach ignores the practicalities of the situation,
and permits a distortion of taxpayer's financial
situation. If an expenditure, conceded ly of temporal value, may be neither expensed nor amortized, the adoption of technological advances is
discouraged. 55
In summary, the first application of the separate,
saleable asset doctrine worked well (steady-state recurring expenditures). When mechanica lly extended,
however, as is the nature of a bright-line test, the
doctrine itself produced distortion of income and, in
time, countervailing authorities,56 as well as further

51Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm 'r, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir.

1973).
52Encyclopedia Britannica, Tn c. v. COll1m 'r, 685 F.2d 212, 217

(7th Cir. 1982).
46"lt does not state ... that if the separate and distinct asset
test is not met the payment is a necessary and ordinary expense." Cleveland Elec., 7 CI. Ct. at 225.
47Cunn, supra at 446, 447 n.20; Lee & Murphy, supra at
54446.
481 certainly would not say, as have other commentators,
that "[w}ith only one limited exception, the other courts followed Briarcliff Candy . .. ." Javaras & Maynes, "Business Expansion and Protection in the Post-INDOPCO World," Ta x
Notes 971, 973 (May 18, 1992).
49See, e.g., Colorado Springs Nafl Bank v. United States, 505
F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974); accord, First Nafl Bank of South
Carolina v. United States, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977); Iowa-Des
Moines Nat'l Bank v. C0Il1111'r, 68 T.e. 872 (1977), afl'd, 592 F.2d
433 (8th Cir. 1979).
5°403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971).
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53See Briarcliff Candy, 475 F.2d at 783.
54505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
55505 F.2d supra at 1192. Judge Posner has applied an
economic efficiency argument to the other side of the coin
(current deduction):
[Ilf a member of this panel rents a safe-deposit box
to keep his securities in, he can deduct the annual
rental under section 21; but if he buys a safe he must
capitalize its purchase price - he can' t just deduct the
price from his investment income in the year of purchase. Otherwise taxpayers would have an incentive
unrelated to the efficient use of resources to buy rather
than rent safe places for their securities.
Fishman v. Comm 'r, 837 F.2d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1988).
56Lee, supra 6 Va. Tax Rev. at 56-57. Thus, it lost the prime
advantage of a bright-line mechanical rule - predictability.
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conceptua l distortions 57 and inevitab le conflicts in linedrawing a s to what was the same business. Some
deci s ion s liberally determined the breadth of the
taxpayer's existing business, while the Tax Court took
a quite narrow approach 5H
NCNB Co rp. v. Ullited States 59 ("NCNB II" ) held that
Lineo/II 5 & L s upersed ed RiehnlOnd TV as to proper
application of the one -yea r rule . The full Fourth Circuit

57ln Dllffy v. Unit ed Stales, 690 F.2d S89 (Ct. Cl. 1982), the
Court of Claims, in determining the trade or business of the
ta xpayer for purposes of the expansion of an ex i ~ tin g business
versus. start-up of a new business tes t, relied upon th e fact
that the taxpayer had "emp loyed" two controll ed corporations to implement his ow n personal busi ness of own ing and
operating a mote\, to conclud e that the ta xpayer had been
engaged in the developmen t, construction , and operation of
hotels so that a commitment fee paid to a potential lender for
the purpose of havi ng fund s made available for construction
of a motel cou ld not be charac teri zed as a s tart-up cos t because
the business was alread y ongoing wh en the expen se was incurred. The Di stri ct Court in Baltill10re Air Coil Co. v. United
Siales, 333 F. Su pp. 705 (D . Md. 1971), allowed a parent co rporation to deduct groundbreaking cos ts, trainee salaries,
travel expenses, employee moving expenses, and minor administrative ex penses incurred in opening a subsidiary in a
different state. The dis tri ct court reasoned that the subsidiary,
which filed a consolidated tax return with its parent, acted as
an agent for and on behalf of its parent, and, while informed,
admittedl y a separate entity, in s ubstance was but one
enterprise with the parent. Therefore, the parent was entitled
to deduct the expenditures paid on behalf of the subsidiary.
COllira Benll ett Paper Corp. v. Co mm ' r , 78 TC 458 (1982), afl'd,
699 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
58The leading "same" or "existing business" expansion
decisions were found in the Fourth Circuit, which in essence
held that all rea l estate ventures, whether residential, commercial, or industrial, cons tituted the sa me business for purposes of currently deducting sta rt-up-like business expansion expenditures. SeeMallIlst edt v .Comlll .r. 578 F.2d 520 (4th
Cir. 1978) ("i t is not th e size of the und ertakings but their
similarity as bu siness ac tivities - whether the qu estion ed
activity represents simpl y the norm al expa nsion of the ex isting bu siness or whether it is within the 'compass' of the
existing business - which is deter minative of whether the
questioned activity represents a new and unrelated business
venture for purposes of applying sec tion 162."); accord York
v. COIII/II ' r, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1955). The Eleventh Circuit
pOinted out that the Fourth Circ uit in York "never considered
the possibility that the ex penditure mi ght be capital in nature, focUSing solely on the requirement of section 162 that
the taxpayer be in the trade or business." Ellis Banking Corp.
v. COIIIIll ' r, 688 F.2d 1376, 1380 n.9 (11th Cir. 1982).
The Tax Court consis tentl y took a narrow approa ch as to
rea l estate. See Sheha n v. COIl1I11'r, 29 CCH TCM. 727 (1970);
Presau/I v. CO I11I11 'r, 34 CC H TCM. 685 (1975); O' Doll/l ell v.
COII/TII'r, 62 TC 781 (1974) . The Ta x Court took a broader
approach outside of rea l estate as to what cons tituted the
taxpa ye r' s busi ness and ex pan sion . See, e .g., Brown v.
COII/III'r, 39 CCH T C M. 397 (1979) (computer monitoring
program new and more effi cient wa y to carryon "LD" tutoring service, expenses were recurring, e.g., telephone, promotion, and trav el); Equitable Life 1ns. Co. of 10wa v. CO II/III ' r , 336
CCH TCM . 11 84 (1977) (rec urring SEC registration ex penses
as to new annuity co ntract deduct ibl e beca use recurring expense of new product in old business) .
59 684 F. 2d 285, 289 nA (4 th Cir. 1982) (ell banc).
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placed itself squarely in the camp of cases allowing expenditures for the expansion of an existing bus iness, following Briarcliff Candy Corp. and the bank credit card
cases. Still another reason the Fourth Circuit in NCNB Jl
used to buttress its en banc opinion was that the p a nel
opinion would have rendered section 195, providing for
amortization of start-up costs, meaningless, for it would
have obliterated the reference point in the s tatute of the
expansion of an existing trade or business.6o Additionally, the rehearing opinion pointed to the S uprem e
Court's opinion in Comm 'r v. Idaho Power CO.,61 which
s tated that where a taxpayer's generally accep ted accounting method is made compulsory by a reg ulatory
agency and clearly reflects income, it is almost presumptively controlling for federal income tax purposes. In
NCNB, the banking regulatory agencies required national
banks to charge to current operations all exp enditures
related to the development a nd expansion of ba nking
services, including credit card programs and, apparently,
branching. Finally, NCNB 11 pointed out that the expenditures in question were in effect recurring becau se the
bank holding company's business was operating a
statewide network of branch banks; and to m a inta in this
network, NCNB had to constantly evaluate its market
position through various means a nd the bank had to
regularly open and close branches and make s imilar
s tudies.62 To the extent that the en bane opinion in NCNB
Jl read Lincoln Savings as providing for current deductibility whenever expenses having prospective benefit do
not create or enhance a separate asset, it was in error. Not
only was the particular statement dictum , but more significantly, as discussed above, there are grounds for
capitalization other than creation or enhancement of a
separate capital asset. One of these is clear reflection of
income,63 This lacuna in the en bane decision is perhaps
most clearly exposed by the s ubsequent Eleventh Circuit
opinion in Ellis Banking discussed below. More s ignificantly, other cases in bank geographic expansion and
then expansion of other businesses began to find tha t the
new location itself or new branch constituted a sep a ra te
a ss et without a definite life, which attracted the
capitalization of sometimes recurring expenses and thus
produced the same distortion of income of no current
deduction and no amortization either.
In Ellis Banking Corp v. Comm'r,64 the ta xpaye r, a
bank ho lding company, w a nted to expand to n ew

60Congress is thus under the impression that expenditures for market studies and feasibility studies, as at
issue here, are fully deductible if incurred by an existing
business undergoing an expanSion. An interpretation by
us to the contrary would render section 195 meaningless
for it would obliterate the reference point in the statute
- "the expansion of an existing trade or business."
NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 291.
61418 U.S. 1 (1974).
62 684 F.2d 293-94.
63See Gunn, "The Requirement that a Capital Ex penditure
Create or Enhance an Asset," 15 B.C. Indll s. & COI1lIll. L. Rev.
443 (1974); Lee & Murphy, "Capital Expenditures: A Result
in Search of a Rationale, " 15 U. Richlllond L. Rev. 473 (1981).
64 688 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.s. 1207
(1983).
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geographic markets, but state law prohibited branch
banking, so expansion was limited to acquiring stock
of existing banks or organizing new banks and subsidiaries. Applying the "origin of the claim" capitalization doc trine enuncia ted by the Supreme Court in
Woodward v. Comm'r6 5 and United States v. Hilton Hotel
Corp.,66 the Eleventh Circuit held that a bank that expands to new markets by acquiring the stock of other
banks must capita lize as an acquisition cost of the stock
the investigation or start-up costs a ttrib utable to such
expansion. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the
anomalous result that virtually identical investigatory
expenditures would be currently deductib le under the
NCNB en bane decision, if incurred in expansion
through branching rather than through purchasing existing banks and operating them as bra nches, but
believed that the Fourth Circuit en bane decision was
in error.67

The most important common factor
was the view that a current deduction
of a recurring expense with some
future benefits was preferable to its
capitalization without amortization 'rough justice. '
In summary, the business expansion cases adopted
the separate asset doctrine because the Service sought
to leave expansion costs in the "black hole" of permanent capi talization. 68 O ther courts, in reaction to the
perceived distortion of currently deducting long-lived
assets, then turned to the acquisition cost doctrine. The
"golden mean" of amortizing business expansion costs
propounded by NCNB I never caught on, probably due
to perceived ability to pass the buck to section 195. But
the lesson is clear: unjust rules, capitalization without
adequate amortization, will cause some (but not all)
courts to seek other solutions promoting uncertainty.
The Treasury fIRS goal of "rough justice" is welcome
and to be celebrated.
D. Repair versus Maintenance

Treas. Reg. section 1.162-4 provides that the cos t of
incidenta l repairs, wh ich neither materially ad d to the
value of the property nor appreciably prolo ng its life,
but keep it in an ordinari ly efficient opera ting condition, may be currently ded u cted as an expense,
provided that the cost of acqu isition or the gain or loss
basis of the taxpayer's p lant, equipment, or other
property is not increased by the amoun t of such expenditures. Repairs in the nature of "replacements," to the
extent that they arrest deteriora tion and apprec iab ly
prolong the life of the property, must ei ther be capitalb5397 u.s. 572 (1970).
6b397 U.s. 580 (1970).
67

688 F.2d 1380 n.7.
68Javaras & Maynes, supra at 975. It was the same injustice
as to start-up costs that compelled me to first begin writing
in this area two decades ago.
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ized and d ep reciated under section 167, or charged
against a dep reciation reserve, if any. Similarly, Treas.
Reg. sec tion 1.263(a)-1 (b) requires capitaliza ti on of
amou nts (a) a dding to the va lu e, (b) substan ti all y
prolonging the useful life of the taxpayer's property,
e.g., p lant or equipment, or (c) adapting such property
to a new or different use.
The repair versus improvement case law developed
a gloss very similar to the Central Texas S&L1Clevelalld
Electric broad capitalization approach under which the
otherwise ded uctible cost of a repair is capitalized if
the repair was part of an overall pattern of rehabili tation. 69 The most sound rationale for the ge neral
rehabilitation rule is that execution of a plan of
rehabilitation constitutes the acquisition of a new capital asset so that all the related expenses must be capitalized. 70 So viewed, the plan of rehabilitation ru le is
analogous to the rule that an expenditure that is part
of the acquisition cost of a capital asset must be capitalized even though standing alone or incurred after
the process of acquisition is complete would be deductible.71 Even so, it ignores the "separate basket" approach to allocation of purchase price and the preACRS analogy of component depreciation.
The Ninth Circuit, in Moss v. Comm'r,n correctly
limited the "rehabilitation doctrine" to substa ntia l
capital improvements and repairs to the same specific
assets (usually a structure in a state of disrepair). In
Moss, the taxpayer-motel capitalized "hard remodeling" costs of beds, chairs, tables, and lamps, and
depreciated them over a seven-year useful life while
currently deducting "soft remodeling" costs for new
carpeting, drapes, and bedspreads amoun ting to about
20 percent of the cost of the hard remodel. The Service
sought to add the costs of the "soft" remodel to the
structure of the building and amortize them over a
30-year useful life. The taxpayer carried out both hard
and soft remodels of each motel room every three to
five years on a rotating cycle so that the contested soft
remodel costs of the newly acquired motel, which had
been allowed to deteriorate, were only twice the usual
annual soft remodel costs. The Ninth Circuit permitted ded uction of the entire soft remodeling costs.
This is another examp le of judicial overreaction to the
Service's income-distorting adjustment. Deprecia ting
soft remodeling costs that would be repeated in three
to five years over 30 years would have produced overstatement of income in the early years. Bu t expensing
such costs in year one surely produced understatement
of income in year one. The fact that year one costs were
double the average stretches the regularly recurring,
69See United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689-90 (lOth Cir.

1968).
70See California Casket Co. v. Comm 'r, 19 T.C 32, 37-8 (1952)
(acquisition of building with express intention of completely
renovating an alternate to coruorm to specific requirements of
business required capitalization of all integral parts of plan).
71 Wilbur's Estate v. Comm'r, 43 T.C 322, 327 n.6 (1964), acq.
1965-2 CB. 7 (the last coat of paint in construction of a new
building must be capitalized). See also Jones v. COI/1I/1 ·r, 24 T.C
563 (1955), afrd, 242 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1957).
72
831 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987).
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steady state notion. The leas t income distorting approach would have been to capitalize the soft remodeling costs and amortize them over, say, four years. (But
again, many of my students opt for current deduction
on examinations.)
The rule that expenditures that materially add to the
value of the property must be capitalized is frequently
indivisible from the doctrine that an expenditure creating
or enhancing a tangible asset with a useful life of more
than one yea r must be capitalized.73 Thus, expenditures
by a hotel for carpets, rugs, padding under carpets,
refrigerator, rehabilitation of hea ting and plumbing and
related work, toilet covers, cloth material, dishwasher,
adding machine, roofing and sheet metal contracts, cooking ran ges, potato peeler, and tile work on kitchen walls
and showers were capi talized because "[slome were for
repairs of a permanent nature which materially added to
the value of the property and appreciably prolonged its
life as an operating hotel; and others were for replacements of furnishings and equipment having a useful life
in excess of one year."74
Any effective repair adds to the value of the property
as compared with its value immediately prior to the
repair/5 Therefore, the proper view is the Tax Court's test:
whether the expenditure materially enhances the value,
etc., as compared with its status prior to the condition
necessitating the expenditure?6 Use of the cheapest expedient to correct a defect in lieu of more costly replacement or restoration is indicative of repalr.n The Service
has declined to apply this test for whether the expenditure increases the value where (1) the property has not
progressively deteriorated, (2) subjective factors, such as
an asbestos-free workplace, have to be considered in
valuing the property after the improvement (removal of
asbestos), and (3) compliance with local requirements
permits cont inu ous operation within re g ulatory
guidelines. 78
The regulations require capi talization of "repairs in
the nature of replacements" if they arrest deterioration
and appreciably prolong the life of the property, while
"incidental repairs" may be currently deducted?9 As a
73See Treas. Reg. section 1.263(a)-2(a) and 1.263(a)-1(b).
74Hotel Kinglwde v. Com m'T, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir.
1950). Query implications of Moss.
75minois MeTchant s Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 4 B.T.A. 103, 107

(1926).
760berman Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 47 T.e. 471,483 (1967).
77See Hlldlow v. Comm 'r, 30 T.CM. 894 (1971) (instead of

removing existing floor and perform a complete restoration,
taxpayer simply covered what was there by pouring in concrete, "which was more in the nature of a cheap, expedient,
fix-up job, and less in the nature of a permanent and enduring improvement. ... ").
78Commentators criticized the Service's narrow reading of
deductible repairs as not appreciably increasing the value of
the repaired property and especially its reasonjng that because the asbestos' remova l costs created long-term benefits,
induding "safer working condi tions for employees, reduced
risk of liability for owners and investors, and generally, increased marketability," they constituted capital expenditures. Sheppard, "Is the IRS AbUSing INDOPCO? ," 56 Tax
Notes 1110 (Aug. 31, 1992).
7~reas. Reg. section 1.162-4.
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practical matter, the result usually is capitalization of
major replacement items. Bo Nevertheless, structural alterations sometimes are deductible. 81 Generally, such
structural expenditures are allowed where they only restore the property to the condition prior to the event
causing the expenditure.82 The regulation'S use of the
term "incidental repairs" has led often to a determination
of whether a major portion of the property has been
replaced. 83
Alterations adapting a building or a particular piece
of equipment so that it can function in a different manner constitute a capital improvement. 54 The rationale
is that adaptation of a piece of equipment or an entire
property to the taxpayer's use is analogous to his/her
purchase of a new asset in which event the purchase
price would have to be capitalized .85 Indeed, this rationale would often cover the rehabilitation cases
which usua ll y involve adapting a building to a different or higher use. But even so, under "componen t"
depreciation such a separate, freestanding asset approach as to intangibles could be taken. (Note: "component" amortization might not be available if the purchase results in use of ACRS by the purchaser; ACRS
prohibits the component method.)
Most, but not all, of the problems in the repair area
would be resolved, if the courts explici tly adopted the
criterion that an expenditure for repair must be capitalized wherever it is sufficiently subs tantial in relation to
the taxpayer's entire business and sufficiently nonrecurring that to deduct it would produce distortion of his/her
income. 86 However, as a practical matter, courts to date
have not followed this approach even though precedents
exist, e.g., the regulation'S expensing of small tools,
books, and furniture by professionals discussed above,

I.e. 455

BOE.g., Phillips & Easton Supply Co. v. Comm 'r, 20
(1953); Alexander Sprunt & Son , Inc. v. Comm'r, 24 B.T.A.
(1931), rev'd on other grou nds, 63 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1933).
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81See Farmer's Creamery Co. v. Comm' r, 14 I.C 879 (1950)
(replacement of less than 50 percent of deteriorated walls,
ceilings, and floors deductible) .
82See, e.g., Oberman Mfg. Co. v. Comm ' r, 47 T.e. 471 (1967).
835ee Denver & Rio Grande Western RR v. CO/ll/ll'r, 279 F.2d
368 (10th Cir. 1960); Buckland v. United Stales, 66 F. Supp. 681,
683 (D. Conn. 1946) (expenditures equal to 35 percent of value
to repair leaky walls and roof deductible) .
84Coors Porcelain Co. v. Comm'T, 52 T.C 682,696-97 (1969),
aff'd on other issues, 429 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1970) (conversi on of
machine from oscillating to rotary action); accord West Va .
Steel Corp. v. Comm'" 34 T.e. 851 (1960) (rewiring factory and
adjacent storage area to rearrange equ ipment for more efficient operation).
85See Sloe/zing v. COnlm'" 266 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1959) (taxpayer bought an old building and made a new and different
building, commercially useful, out of it).
86Gunn, supra at 458-59; Lee and Murphy, supra at 541-43.
I do not believe that a subj ective purpose test will preva il
here. Contra Adams & Hinderliter, "INDOPCO, In c. v. COIIImissioner: Impact Beyond Friendly Takeovers," 55 Tax Nol es
93, 96, 102 (April 6, 1992). The Supreme Court expressly
rejected a subjective purpose test for capitalization in favor
of an objective "origin-of-the-c\aim" test in Woodward/Hilton
Hotel, supra, decided six years after General Bancshares v.
COIllIll'" 326 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1964).
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and the more explicit recognition in Sharon v. Comm'r,87
Cillcinnati-New Orleans & Texas Pacific RR v. United States,58
Southland Royalty Co. v. United States,89 Encyclopedia Britan/lica, Inc. v. Comm'r,90 and Waldheim Realty and Investment Co.
v. Comm'r,91 as discussed below. With the renewed emphasis
on future benefit and attention to repairs, however, a new
day may be dawning. In contrast, the above-noted asbestos-removal TAM, in its shotgun approach, also rested on
the permanency of the one-time asbestos removal.
"Removal is a one-time expenditure that results in a significant change to the property and is not remedial."
IV. THE PROPER APPROACH

Classic depreciation of tangible property (prior to accelerated depreciation and especially ACRS) and current
amortization of intangible property conceptually consist
of allocating a capitalized cost (usually ratably) to the tax
years to which it contributes to production of income, i.e.,
its useful life. Capitalization coupled with amortization
is therefore necessary to prevent the distortion (here, understatement) of the taxpayer's net income that would
result from deducting the entire cost currently of an expenditure "properly attributable, through amortization,
to later tax years when the capital asset becomes incomeproducing." The critical question is whether current
deduction of an expenditure benefitting future years
will result in more than minimal distortion of income.
If not, and the burden of capitalization and amortization will be heavy, the expenditure should be currently
deducted in its entirety in the year made. The first case
explicitl y s uggesting such an approach is Cincinnati
N.O. & Tex Pac. RR v. United States.92 The taxpayer
operated a railroad supervised by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), whi ch required that financial
statements be prepared according to its "General Instructions of Accounting Classifications." From
January I, 1921, to January 31, 1940, they provided a
"minimum rule" that railroads account for purchases
of property (other than track) of less than $100 by
charging them to operating expenses rather than to a
capital account. In 1940, the ICC raised the minimum
rule ceiling from $100 to $500. The government asserted that since the items accounted for by the minimum rule admittedly had a useful life longer than one
year, they necessarily constituted permanent improvements or betterments, and, therefore, must be capital87 66 T.e. 515 (1976), aII'd per curiam, 591 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 422 U.s. 941 (1979).
88424 F.2d 536 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
89582 F.2d 604 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
90685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982).
91
245 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1957) (current deduction of regularly
prepa id multiyear business insurance did not distort income).
92424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970); see generally Gunn, supra. This
decision wa s foreshadowed by the Eighth Circuit, in
Waldheim Realty & lnvf'stment Co. v. Comm'r, 245 F.2d 823, 827
(8th Cir. 1957), which similarly determined that there was no
distortion of income for purposes of the predecessor to section 446(b) where the taxpayer regularly deducted prepaid
premiums on multiyear insurance policies because "it is extremely doubtful whether any substantial difference would
result over a period of years."
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ized ipso facto without consideration of any other factors . The Court of Claims noted that this position
would require that the method-of-accounting sections
of section 446 be subordinated to the capital expenditure and depreciation sections of the code. 93 To the
contrary, the court held that the capitalization,
depreciation, and method-of-accounting provisions are
"inextricably intertwined" and must be utilized in conjunction in deciding the ultimate issue of the success
of the taxpayer's method in clearly reflecting income.
Where the burden on both taxpayers and Service to account for each item of property separately
is great, and the likelihood of dis tortion of income
is nil or minimal, the Code is not so rigid and so
impracticable that it demands that nevertheless
all items be accounted for individually, no matter
what the trouble or the onus....
The burden on plaintiff, if the minimum rule
is not to be followed for income tax purposes,
would be heavy; at the same time, the clearer
reflection of income would be exceedingly slight
if there were any at all. 94

The critical question is whether current
deduction of an expenditure benefitting
future years will result in more than
minimal distortion of income.

I

Subsequently, th e Court of Claims in Southland
Royalty Co. v. United States,95 again focu sed on the
a mount of distortion and hard s hip to the taxpayer as
well as the inappropriateness of amortization as critical
to current deductibility of recurring short-lived oil and
gas survey costs. 96
Decisive for the deductibility of the expenses
incurred for the Gillespie report is that they are
functionally part of, and indistinguishable from,
expenditures for ordinary management planning ... . Here the Government does not argue that
there is some underlying tangible or intangible
asset to which the survey costs may properly be
added .... Neither is amortization appropriate. The
useful life of the survey is very uncertain[ ... . I]t is
not compulsory to amortize such a recurring item
over a fixed time-interval. Neither is it appropriate
to require capitalization without amortization; such
a requirement would dearly distort Southland's income .. .. [T}he fact that expenditures provide
benefits more than one year into the future is
merely a factor for consideration and "does not
mean that, by a Pavlovian reflex, they must always be non-deductible .... " 97
93Sec tions 263 and 167.
94424 F.2d at 572.
95 582 F.2d 604, 616 (Ct. CI. 1978).
96A student once informed me that oil and gas surveys are
recurring because other drilling and pumping in the area and
movement of underground water changes the underground
reserves.
97882 F.2d at 616-18 (footnote omitted).
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Such minimal distortion is produced by the current
deduction of an expenditure with future benefits where
the expenditure: (1) is not substantial in relationship
to the taxpayer's overall income for the year or its
useful life is short (as illustrated by Cinn. N.O. and
Southlalld Royalty above); (2) recurs regularly or annually in roughly equivalent amounts (as illustrated in
Encyclopedia Britannica 98 ); or perhaps (3) cannot be

98We can think of a practical reason for allowing
authors to deduct their expenses immediately, one applicable as well to publishers though not in the circumstances of the present case. If you are in the business
of producing a series of assets that will yield income over
a period of years - which is the situation of most
authors and all publishers - identifying particular expenditures with particular books, a necessary step for
proper capitalization because the useful lives of the
books will not be the same, may be very difficult, since
the expenditures of an author or publishers (more clearly
the latter) tend to be joint among several books. Moreover,
allocating these expenditures among the different books
is not always necessary to produce the temporal matching
of income and expenditures that the Code disiderates,
because the taxable income of the author or publisher who
is in a steady state (that is, whose output is neither increasing nor decreasing) will be a t least approximately the same
whether his costs are expensed or capitalized. Not the
same in any given book - on each book expenses and
receipts will be systematically mismatched - but the same
on average. Under these conditions the benefits of
capitalization are unlikely to exceed the accounting and
oth~r. a.d,?1.inistrative costs entailed in capitalization.
There is another point to be noted about the distinction between recurring and nonrecurring expenses and
its bearing on the issue in this case. If one really takes
seriously the concept of a capital expenditure as anything that yields income, actual or imputed, beyond the
period (conventionally one year, United States v. Wehrli,
400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968)) in which the expenditure is made, the result will be to force the capitalization
of virtually every business expense. It is a result courts
naturally shy away from . See, e.g., Briarcliff Candy Corp.
v. Commissioner of InternaJ Revenue, 475 F.2d 775,785 (2d
Cir. 1973). It would require capitalizing every salesman's
salary, since his selling activities create goodwill for the
company and goodwill is an asset yielding income
beyond the year in which the salary expense is incurred.
The administrative costs of conceptual rigor are too
great. The distinction between recurring and nonrecurring business expenses provides a very crude but perhaps serviceable demarcation between those capital
expenditures that can feaSibly be capitalized and those
that cannot be. Whether the distinction breaks down
where, as in the case of the conventional publisher, the
firm's entire business is the production of capital assets,
so that it is literally true that all of its business expenses
are capital in nature, is happily not a question we have
to decide here, for it is clear that Encyclopedia
Britannica's payments to David-Stewart were of a nonnormal, nonrecurrent nature.
Encyclopedia Brita/1I1ica, 685 F.2d at 213-17 (Judge Posner).
The recurring/nonrecurring and "steady state" concepts underlay the bank credit card cases and Briarcliff Candy as well
as Southland Royalty. See Lee, supra 6 Va. Tax Rev. at 18-20.
Implicitly WaJdheim Realty rested in part on this notion.
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clearly associated with either current or future tax
years. 99
Judge Posner noted an apparent tension between the
current deduction of recurring, steady state expenditures and Idaho Power's mandate of capitalization of
costs identified with the acquisition of specific capital
assets. Reconciliation of the two lies in the "separa te
basket" approach to purchase price allocations. The
acquisition cost doctrine is compatible with the timingminimum-distortion-of-income principle only so long
as the expenditure made in connection with the acquisition of a capital asset does not produce benefits
for a shorter period than the asset to whose basis it is
added. If, however, the expenditure's benefits last for
a shorter period than the useful life of the capital asset
acquired, capitalization of the expenditure and its addition to the basis of the asset acquired itself produces
distortion of income through depreciation or amortization over a longer period than that benefitted by the
expenditure, or at worst, by no amortization at all. The
solution to the potential conflict between current deductibility of recurring steady state expenditures and
the acquisition cost doctrine lies in which "asset" is
acquired. For in addition to the "origin-of-the-c1aim"
doctrine, avoiding such distortion of income also requires the use of a judicially approved accounting concept: treatment of the expenditure itself as a separate,
freestanding asset, a "deferred charge" in financial or
"book" accounting terms,100 and then amortization of
its cost over the period benefitted, as the Tax Court
innovatively did in Wolfson Land & Cattle Co. v.
Comm'r. 101
What Judge Posner overlooked in Encyclopedia
Britannica is that in acquiring a capital asset consisting
of a mass of assets, the purcl1ase price is allocated
separately to each asset or class of assets. This principle
is seen in the purchase of a business, now governed by
section 1060, and in the purchase of a depreciable asset
such as a building in the optional pre -ACRS component depreCiation. Of course, in Idaho Power, the
benefit from transporting the construction workers extended over the life of the structure they built so that
99[T)here is a residuum of current expenditures which
will have some future benefit but which "cannot, as a
practical matter, be associated with any other period "
and allocation of which "ei ther on the basis of association with revenue or among several accounting periods
is considered to serve no useful purpose. These also
are currently deductible. An example might be the
salary of a high corporate officer whose time is not
practically allocable between present operations and
future projects.
NCNB (/), 651 F.2d at 961-62 (footnotes omitted and
seco nd quote not closed in original) .
looFor a detailed discussion of these financial accounting
terms in the context of amortization of business expansion
costs as a freestanding asset see NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 948-50.
101
72 T.c. 1, 11-13 (1979){treatment of decennial dredging
of irrigation ditches with 50-year life as "a free-standing intangible asset with an amortizable 10-year life. "). Professor
Gunn had a lso suggested thi s solution to intractable
capitalization problems. Gunn, supra at 445-46; accord Lee,
supra 6 Va. Tax Rev. 30-41.
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the depreciation had to be added to the structure itself.
(And the same was true on the facts of the particular
nonrecurring expenditures in Encyclopedia Britannica,
as Judge Posner noted.) But where the intangible, such
as training the initial work force or start-up advertising,
provides benefits for a shorter period than the broader
capital asset of the business or permit, it should be set up
as a freestanding amortizable asset - a deferred charge.
If the period benefitted is short or highly variable, so that
amortization over a period ot years is difficult or impossible, and the expenditure is at least "steady-state" recurring, then the cost treated as a separate asset should be
ded ucted in its entirety in the year made. 102 The Tax Court
obliquely approved this latter notion in its approval of
the result, but not the reasoning, of a start-up decision
approving the deduction in the year made of recurring,
operating expenses such as wages, utilities, and advertis ing in curred in the same year that a nursing home
received its license and commenced operations but
before such receipt. "We think the expenses in Manor
Care were clearly pre-operating in nature [and, hence,
not deductible under section 162]. However, to the extent the expenditures created assets with determinable
useful lives benefiting taxable years following the start
of business operations, such amounts would be deductible during those taxable years in the form of amortization deductions irr e spective of when they were
paid ."lo3 Deduction of the start-up costs in their entirety in year one 104 thus rested on treatment of the
expenditures as freestanding intangibles, rather than
being added to the basis of the business as a whole or
to the permit and on the reasonable amount of
depreciation being the entire expenditure because it
did not provide benefits beyond the year made. Query
whether the latter was true as to the advertising. The
better basis there of current deduction is the recurring,
steady-state concept.
A panel of the Fourth Circuit in NCNB Corp. v. Ullited
States 105 considered the deductibility of expansion costs
of an existing banking business, which were analogous
to start-up costs of a new business. These costs were
incurred in selecting an area of the state for expansion,
planning future branches in that area, turning such
general plans into concrete courses of action, obtaining
the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, and
involved internal (e.g., salaries, depreciation, and
amortization) and external (e.g., fees paid to the Comptroller, attorney's fees, amounts paid to outside consultants for marketing studies) costs. The taxpayer argued that, because expenditures did not create a
separate capital asset or a property interest and because

102S oll thland

Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 617

(Ct. Cl. 19780; Iowa-Des Moines Nat'[ Bank v. Comm'r, 592 F.2d

433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979); Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc . v. Comm'r,
685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982).
103Goodwin v. Comlll'r, 75 T.e. 424, 433-34 n.9 (1980), affd
mem., 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982).
104 OW that section 195 is preemptive, this result is no.
longer permitted.
105
651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1981) ("NCNB /,,), vacated, 684 F.2d
285 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc) ("NCNB 1I").
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they were involved in expanding an old business, they
were currently deductible under authorities such as
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm'r,t06 and the bank credit
card cases, such as Colorado Springs National Bank v. United
States. 107 The taxpayer argued that, therefore, the only
possible grounds for capitalizing the expenditures would
be a rule requiring capitalizatio.n of all expenditures that
pro.duce for the enterprise a future benefit, which, it argued, was rejected in Lincoln Savings.lOB

Where an intangible provides benefits
for a shorter period than the broader
capital asset of the business or
permit, it should be set up as a
freestanding amortizable asset.
NCNB I rejected Briarcliff Candy and its bank credit
card progeny and did not read Lincoln Savings as requiring capitalization only where there is a separate
asset. Nor did the panel take the position that all expenditures benefitting future years must be capitalized. Rather, it held that where a current deduction of
expenditures would distort inco.me, as would generally
be the case where expenditures benefit present and
future years (the panel overly hastily catego.rized
various exceptions as rules of convenience), the expenditure must be capitalized. Otherwise, clear reflection
of income would not result. Such capitalization was in
the eyes of the panel "compelled by the statutory requirement of a method of accounting which will'clearly reflect income' by recognizing in the same tax year
both growth revenues and the cost of producing those
revenues ."109 Probably, the most innovative holding of
the NCNB I panel opinion was to reject the all-or-nothing appro.ach of the prior case law (current deduction
or capitalization without amortization) and allow a
partial current deduction plus a deduction over future
years, i.e., amortization, to the extent that the taxpayer
could show that the expenditures were properly allo.cable to the present and future years. lIO Prior cases,
106 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
107505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974).
108 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971).
109 651 F.2d 961. The panel overly relied Dn generally accepted accounting principles as providing an answer here.
NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 948, 952-53.
11 0651 F.2d at 962-63. Judge Murhagan, authDr of the panel
decision, dissented to. the en banc decisio.n.
To. sum it all up, we have here a case where an
oppDrtunity to resort to. the go.lden mean is ignDre d~
Start-up expenditures, and Dther expenditures like
start-up expenditures except that they co.ncern existing
businesses, o.ften have multi-year lives or applications.
In such cases they shDuld not be immediately fully
deductible in the year paid or incurred as ordinary and
necessary expenses. Rather they should be capitalized
and prorated. That is to. say that they should, o.ver time,
be deductible for inCDme tax purposes, but not all at
once, in one fell swoop.
684 F.2d at 295-96.
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where capitalizing analogous start-up costs, had allowed no deduction, only a basis increase which could
not be recovered by depreciation since the business
generally had no definitely determinable life.

The most innovative holding of the
HeNB I panel was to reject the
all-or-nothing approach of the prior
case law and allow a partial current
deduction plus a deduction over
future years.
The panel decision in NCNB 1 would have allowed a
Cohan-type approximation to match revenue and expenses. "If the [lower) court finds the taxpayer did make
some use of the Metro Studies in its current-revenueproducing operations, then even if no better than a rough
guess is possible, some allocation should be made, and
the resulting faction of the amortization allowance may
be taken as a current deduction."lIl The clear reflection
of income approach adopted by the panel in NCNB had
been called for by commentators. lI2 The assumption of
the panel that revenues could be traced to particular
expenditures, however, is extremely questionable.
Moreover, the Cohan rule of approximation technically
appears to be unavailable in refund suits where the taxpayer must prove the correct amount of tax payable to
prevail. ll3 Ironically, NCNB I was a refund suit. Commentators were quick to point out that the NCNB I panel
approach would render section 195 unavailable as to
start-up expenditures, as well as investigatory costs, due
to the section's incorporation of deductibility by an existing business as a standard for amortization. 11 4 Now
they make the same complaint as to INDOPCO.ll5
111651 F.2d at 962.
l12See Note, "Deductibility of Start-Up Expenditures
Under Section 162 - The 'Clear-Reflection-of-lncome' Test,"
61 Cornell L. Rev. 618 (1976).
Il3S ee Lee, "Section 482 and the Integrated Business
Enterprise," 57 Va. L. Rev. 1376, 1400 at n.129 (1971). For a
discussion of more traditional use of Cohan to approximate
useful life for amortization purposes see Lee, supra 6 Va. Tax
L. Rev. at 38-41.
114See Shapiro & Shaw, "Start-Up Expenditures - Section
195: Clarification or More Confusion?," 34 So. Cal. Tax Inst.
11-1,11-20 (1982); Warner, "Deductibility of Business Expansion Expenses - NCNB Corp . v. U.S .," TMM 81-22 (1981).
llSSee Javaras and Todd, "Business Expansion and Protection in the Post-INDOPCO World," 55 Tax Notes 971, 975 (May
18, 1992) (grasping at straws, authors argue that this result
should be avoided through doctrine of legislative reenactment); Note, "Deductibility of Takeover and Non-Takeover
Expenses in the Wake of INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner," 35
Tax Law. 815,823 (1992) . As the ultimate source of the incorporation in section 195'5 legislative history of the separate
asset doctrine, I would like to point out that the issue of the
continued viability of section 195 merits a more thorough and
hopefully more balanced treatment than the above. Compare
Lee, supra 6 Va. Tax Rev. at 71-6, 86-91. And vitiating section
195 would not leave a black hole without amortization into
which business expansion costs would fall.
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The Fourth Circuit en bane reversed the panel
decision on the basis that no separate saleable asset
was created and overruled the future benefits leg of
Richmond Television, the earlier Fourth Circuit precedent establishing the start-up doctrine. The Supreme
Court in INDOPCO in turn saw NCNB (en bane) as
conflicting with the Third Circuit opinion in National
Starch, which it affirmed. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court also pointed to Central Texas Savings and Loan as
"inquiring whether establishment of new branches
'creates a separate and distinct asset' so that capitalization is the proper tax treatment."116 Almost 20 years
ago, Professor Gunn pointed out that a fundamental
error in the cases was increasing the basis of the wrong
asset, generally nondepreciable such as the business or
an indefinite permit, rather than treating an expenditure creating future benefits of a finite duration as the
asset itself, i.e., an amortizable, freestanding deferred
charge. It is to be hoped that we will not have to go
through another round of increasing the wrong basis
with resultant distortion of income . The courts'
flexibility in avoiding distortion of income as business
expansion costs should lie in (a) approximating or estimating useful lives of the costs as freestanding intangibles under Cohan v. Comm'r,1I7 or (b) determining that
a current deduction produces minimal distortion of
income. 118
The en bane opinion in NCNB 1J may be reconcilable
with a distortion-of-income approach since it found the
expenditures in effect to be recurring. Regularly recurring expenditures, provided that they are not substantially greater in one year than in another, do not present
a distortion-of-income problem when they are

116112 S. Ct. at 1042 n.3.
11739 f,2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930).
1I81n Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States, 505
F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974), the court relied heavily on
Briarcliff Candy and allowed a current deduction under
section 162(a) for all of a taxpayer 's preoperational
expenditures in connection with beginning participation in a national credit card system. Although the
expenditures were of a sort which would frequently
recur (thus suggesting that any benefits obtained had
a determinable useful life) and although the taxpayer
had recognized some revenues from the credit card
program during the tax year in question, the Commissioner suggested to the court no way in which the
expenditures might be amortized, and thus deductible
partially in that tax year, nor, indeed, did he suggest
that they might ever be deductible. ld. at 1192. Rejecting a scheme under which "an expenditure, concededly
of temporal value, may be neither expensed nor amortized," the court allowed the current-expense deduction. [d. (emphasis added) .. ..
In conection with multi-year intangible benefits,
however, the Commissioner generally allows amortization to begin once the remaining useful life of the asset
in question can be estimated with reasonable accuracy.
See Treas. Reg. section 1.167(a)-3. The taxpayer in the
instant case is, therefore, not faced with the Ca tch-22
from which the Tenth Circuit believed that it had to
rescue Colorado Springs National Bank.
NCNB Bank (I), 651 F.2d 959-60.
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deducted currentl y even thou gh they benefi t present
and future years. This approach also would reconcile
current deductibility of advertising expenses, which
generally benefit present and future years, with the
distortion-of-income approach.

Regularly recurring expenditures,
provided that they are not
substantially greater in one year than
in another, do not present a
distortion-ot-income problem when
they are deducted currently_
umrnarizing, the freestanding asset model entails
a two-step analysis: (1) look a t whether current deduction of an expenditure will distort the taxpayer's income (because the expenditure provides future benefits
and is neither sufficiently insubstantial nor recurring
to be nondistorting if currently deducted); if so, (2)
estimate the period benefitted by the expenditure, i.e.,
the useful life, and amortize the expenditure as a freestanding asset over that period. 1l9
Admittedly, thi s model ignores "time-value of
money" notions.J20 The proposal was originally
directed to the courts, which decline to adopt such
notions as a common-law doctrine.l2l Congress is the
better target for such pleas and it is inclined to leave
self-created intangibles of a going concern alone as
evidenced by sections 195 and 263A and proposed section 197. This article is primarily directed to Treasury
and the IRS, and they will be well-advised to ignore
time-value considerations as well in accordance with
their stated goals of making "do with 'rough justice'
and accept[ing] that life is messy rather than be[ing]
motivated by a quest for theoretica l purity. General
principles are often better than detailed rules."122
V. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Employee Training Expenses

Where employee training expenses are regularly
recu rring in roughly the same amount either as retraining or replacement training, the expenditures should
be currently deductible. Fluctuations of up to 20 percent 123 from the average should also be currently deductible. In the case of initial employee training in a
different business before the active business commences
or if after but greatly exceed ing average retraining and
replacement training costs, five-year amortization

1I9See Lee, supra 6 Va. Tax Rev. 12-15.
120Johnson, "Soft Money Investing Under the In come
Tax," 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1019,1072-77,1086-89.
I21See, e.g., Follander v. Comm'r, 89 T.e. 943 (1987); Coven,
"Redefining Debt; Of Indianapolis Power and Fictitious Interest," 10 Va. Tax Rev. 587, 589-90 (1991).
122"1992 Business Plan," elect ronically reproduced 92 Tax
Notes Today 104-50.

12.1This percentage was chosen on the basis of the five-year
amortization model discussed below.
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should be permitted either under section 195 or by
analogy. 124 (Of course, section 195 no longer works as
a matter of theory after the overturning of the separate
asset doctrine,125 but Treasury and the Service should
positively state that they will permit section 195 elections as to recurring, short-lived, or insubstantial startup expenditures and perhaps even investigatory costs
incurred prior to commencement of the different active
business.) Similar five-year amortization should be allowed for initial training expenses substantially above
the average retraining, etc., costs in expanding the
same business. Given that most taxpayers are surely
currently deducting such expenses, even if erroneously, revenue neutrality should not demand that the
proposed section 197 amortization period be used .
B. Advertising

As a conceptual matter, deduction of general goodwill advertising, even of specific goods or services,
should be treated much the same as employee training
costs with a focus on recurrence and steady state.
Politically, however, limitation of current deductibility
of most advertising costs is contraindicated by Ways
and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski's, O-III.,
specific exclusion of advertising costs from the purview of proposed section 197.126 Therefore, it might be
advisable to allow current deduction of advertising
expenses that substantially exceed the average level or
the level in succeeding years. This is the approach implicitly taken in Rev. Rul. 92-80, which simply states
that advertising costs are "generally deductible" under
section 162 "even though advertising may have some
future effect on business activities, as in the case of
institutional or goodwill advertising."
Where advertising primarily is to help acquire a
specific capital asset and its benefits will be coterminous with the life of such asset, it should be treated
as an acquisition added to such asset. The key issue is
whether the advertising benefits are coterminous. Unfortunately, Rev. Rul. 92-80 may obscure analysis of this
problem. It stated the issue as whether the advertising
"is directed towards obtaining future benefits significantly beyond those traditionally associated with
ordinary product advertising or with institutional or

l24It is likely not administratively feasible to determine on
a case-by-case basis the actual retraining and replacement
training rates and the actual useful life of the training costs at
least for smaller businesses. Where it probably is feasible, say,
at the $100 million or more level in corporate assets, requiring
actual establishment of useful lives is not objectionable. Those
10,000 corporations report almost 80 percent of the corporate
sector revenues and most are in continual audit. This level
could even be raised to the 5,000 corporations with $250 million or more in assets which report almost 75 percent of the
corporate sector income.
125Src note 114, supra.
J26"Unofficial TranSCript of October 2 Ways and Means
Committee Hearing on Amortization of Intangibles," 91 Tax
Notes Today 208-26 ("Some persons have questioned whether
this bill was intended to open the door for reconsidering tax
deductions for advertising expenses. Let me be clear. The
answer is, no. ") (Statement of Chairman Rostenkowski).

683

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

goodwill advertising," in which case the costs of such
advertising must be capi talized. The ruling accurately
described the advertising costs in Cleveland Electric l 27
as "incurred to allay public opposition to the granting
of a license to construct a nuclear power plant." But
the policy-based reason that the advertising costs
shou ld be capitalized and added to the basis of the
permit is that they were not recurring, were substantial, and, because their benefit can not be separated
from the permit itself, constituted an acquisition cost
of the permit.

C. Repairs
Deductibility of repairs has been the mos t frequently
litigated of these mixed present-future benefit areas,
but the case law has evolved less here than in the other
areas. Here, Treasury fiRS could provide the most help
by establishing safe harbors for repairs. The most useful would be one based on a percentage of depreciation
allowance similar to the "repair allowance" under the
old Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) system. 128 There,
the safe harbor went as high as 15 percent for trucks,
but most seemed to cluster around 10 percent, with
much lower percentages for heavy manufacturing
equipment and especially for buildings. Here, too, a
distinction between big and little taxpayers might be
useful. Also, temporary 1992 standards might be advisable, with more detailed and accurate categories
later based on actual historical experience of classes of
taxpayers.
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comments by tax practitioners and tax-related correspondence between the T reasury Department,
members of Congress and others.
~Sooner than anybody else- is another sound
reason for m eetin g your tax information needs
through H&D. mrs important. you'll read it here first.

Indexes.
Each article. summary. or document in H&D is
organi7.ed into indexes printed monthly and quarterly.
These comprehensive tools make you a referencegenius.

Abstracts &: Citations.
Readers doing keyword searches of lengthy documents (IRS regulations. congressional committee
reports. etc.) know the value of H&D's Abstracts &
Citations. The citations prOvide a quick overview of the
day's documents. facilitating your searches.

Call 1-800-955-2444
In the Washington, D.C. area,
call (703) 533-4600.

127C1eueland Elec/ric, 7 Cl. Ct. 230-32.
128See Withdrawn Treas. Reg. section 1.167-11(d)(2) and
Rev. Proc. 72-10, 1972-1 C.B. 721.
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